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This book provides the first systematic, integrated, analytical account of the evolution of 
the international economy during the last millennium.It emphasizes the two-way 
interaction between trade and geopolitics, and the importance of such interactions for 
world economic development. PREFACE 
 
  This book was written in the belief that you cannot make sense of today’s world 
economy, or indeed of the world more generally, without understanding the history that  
produced it. Contemporary ‘globalization’, and its economic and political consequences, 
has not arisen out of a vacuum, but from a worldwide process of uneven economic 
development that has been centuries, if not millennia, in the making. In turn, this process 
has been critically shaped by the changing ways in which the various world  regions have 
interacted with each other, not only through trade, migration and investment, but also 
politically and culturally, over time. Understanding this two-way interaction between the 
pattern and evolution of inter-regional trade, on the one hand, and long-term global 
economic and political developments on the other, is the main purpose of this volume. 
  As is the case with many books, this one has been written for the primary benefit 
of the authors. Countless economic histories of countries or regions have already been 
written, and there is now a rapidly growing literature on ‘world history’, and indeed on 
‘world economic history’. There is also a more specialized, but still immense, literature 
on the history of international trade, with individual authors typically focusing on 
particular regions or time periods. What both of us found, however, when preparing 
lectures on the long run history of world trade, or writing research papers on the subject, 
is that there was no one place that we could turn to for answers to the questions that we, 
as economists, would ask about the subject. Instead, we have had to become familiar – 
although no doubt we remain insufficiently so – with a vast and highly specialized 
scholarly literature, and have found ourselves on numerous occasions plowing through 
the same sources looking for the odd nugget of information that was relevant for our 
  1purposes. In this manner, we gradually became independently convinced of the need for a 
single book that would provide as comprehensive and integrated an overview as possible 
of the history of world trade during the second millennium. 
  Even if we consider such an apparently specific and familiar a subject as the spice 
trade, for example, we find that there is no single authoritative account of it available in 
the existing literature. The reasons why this is so are quite obvious. The spices were 
produced in the islands of the Indonesian archipelago, transported across the Indian 
Ocean by Persians, Arabs, Gujaratis, Portuguese, Dutchmen and sundry others to the Red 
Sea or the Persian Gulf, or around the Cape of Good Hope, taxed by Abbasids, Fatimids, 
Mamluks, Safavids and other Middle Eastern regimes, distributed further west and north 
by Venetians or Genoese, before being purchased as far west as England and France, 
usually with silver that then had to wind its way back again to the Moluccas before the 
circuit was closed. And this is only to consider spice flows to Europe, when flows to 
China and other Asian markets were much more important during most of history. No 
single historian, not even a Fernand Braudel, could command all the specialized 
knowledge and skills necessary to cover the entire stretch of space and time involved; and 
this is only one of many topics that we would like our history of world trade to cover. 
Providing such a book thus requires breaking free of the twin tyrannies of temporal and 
spatial parochialism, which is undoubtedly a risky venture. 
  There have been other world economic histories written in the recent past, but 
while we have learned much from them, none of them quite provided what we were 
looking for. Rondo Cameron’s (1989) Concise Economic History of the World: from 
Paleolithic Times to the Present covers an even longer time span than our mere 
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and other contacts between the various world regions that is the concern of the present 
work. Janet Abu-Lughod’s (1989) highly influential Before European Hegemony: the 
World-System AD 1250-1350, on the other hand, is concerned with exactly the sort of 
interactive relationships between the different segments of the world economy that we 
consider here, but is temporally confined to a single, albeit crucial century, the period of 
the Pax Mongolica. David Landes (1998) tells us in his Preface that his aim is to “trace 
and understand the main stream of economic advance and modernization”, which he 
locates firmly in Europe. While we will also of necessity be concerned with the process 
of economic growth, our emphasis is more on the pattern and structure of trade, on 
geopolitical evolution over time, and on the shifting balances of world primacy over the 
past thousand years. 
  As evidenced by the very title of his stimulating contribution, Eric Jones’ (2003) 
The European Miracle is also Eurocentric in its orientation. Jones starts at about the time 
of the Discoveries, taking as his units of comparison the European system of competing 
nation-states and the non-European empires of the Islamic Ottomans and Mughals, and 
the Manchu Qing Dynasty. The rise of Europe is one of the major themes of this book, as 
it is of his, but we cover a longer time-span than does Jones, and our units are the seven 
regions defined in Chapter 1, rather than the European states and three Asian empires he 
considers. Jones has been the target of what he calls the ‘California School’ of 
Sinocentric historians, in particular Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) and R. Bin Wong (1997), 
as well as Andre Gunder Frank (1998). We hope to convince our readers that, like 
Ulysses bound to the mast, we manage to avoid both the Scylla of Eurocentrism and the 
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world besides, have contributed to the interactive emergence of the modern world 
economy, even though not necessarily to the same degree. 
  Thus we ourselves have had to laboriously piece together what is still a very 
rudimentary and inadequate account of trade during the last millennium. There are of 
course many specialists on each aspect of this subject whose knowledge vastly exceeds 
ours on their specialty, but we hope that we can at least lighten the labor of the many who 
might desire, as we did, an overview of this subject as a whole. Furthermore, the history 
of world trade is only one aspect of the task that we have had to undertake. A feature of 
the book that may strike some economists as odd or surprising, but will seem entirely 
commonplace to historians, is its sustained emphasis on conflict, violence and 
geopolitics. When economics students are first exposed to the study of international trade, 
they are asked to contemplate two countries, A and B, who have each been endowed with 
a certain amount of the various factors of production – land, labor, capital and so on – as 
well as with a given technology which translates those endowments into consumption 
goods, together with a set of preferences over these goods. The two countries then trade 
with each other, or not as the case may be, and the consequences of trade are derived for 
consumers and producers alike. If time is brought into the theory at all, and usually it 
isn’t, this typically takes the form of allowing countries to gradually accumulate capital, 
breed new workers, or become better educated as a result of the voluntary decisions of 
rational, free individuals. The summit of unpleasantness attainable in such models is the 
use of tariffs, quotas and other trade policy instruments that will benefit some individuals 
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residents. 
  If only life were like this. As we point out below, the greatest expansions of world 
trade have tended to come, not from the bloodless tâtonnement of some fictional 
Walrasian auctioneer, but from the barrel of a Maxim gun, the edge of a scimitar, or the 
ferocity of nomadic horsemen. When trade required more workers, parental choices 
regarding quality/quantity tradeoffs could often safely be ignored, since workers could 
always be enslaved. When trade required more profits, these could be earned via plunder 
or violently imposed monopolies. For much of our period the pattern of trade can only be 
understood as being the outcome of some military or political equilibrium between 
contending powers. The dependence of trade on war and peace eventually became so 
obvious to us that it is reflected in the title of this volume. 
  Politics thus determined trade, but trade also helped to determine politics, by 
influencing the capacities and the incentives facing states. The mutual dependence of 
Power and Plenty, so well evoked by Jacob Viner (1948), will thus be a key feature of 
this book. While economists have traditionally stressed the advantages of peaceful 
voluntary exchange, we should not forget that the use of force involves the allocation of 
scarce resources as well, and imposes costs and benefits both on those who use it, and on 
those against whom it is used, as well as on third parties. It is therefore as much subject to 
the application of economic analysis, “the study of the relationship between ends and 
scarce means that have alternative uses” in the famous definition of Lionel Robbins, as 
any other sphere of human activity. 
  5  If all this may appear to have been less true over the course of the last two 
centuries, this is because of the overwhelming influence of the Industrial Revolution on 
all subsequent economic history. The nineteenth century globalization that followed this 
breakthrough was unprecedented in many ways, and as we will see perhaps its most 
clearly distinguishing feature was its largely technological underpinnings (although even 
in this period imperialism still had an important role to play, and was itself facilitated in 
many ways by the new technology). The new technologies not only brought markets 
closer together than ever before, but opened up enormous income gaps between regions 
that remain with us today, and produced a stark division of labor between a 
manufacturing core and a primary-producing periphery. The big questions ever since then 
have been: How can developing countries catch up with the core? Should they do so by 
exploiting their natural resource advantages, as was successfully tried in the nineteenth 
century, or does this leave them excessively vulnerable to fickle international markets, as 
the interwar experience might suggest? Should they decouple themselves from 
international markets as many did after 1945, or reintegrate with them as they have done 
over the past two decades? These questions, and related ones such as how the West 
should accommodate the rise of India and China, have only arisen because of the 
asymmetries created by the Industrial Revolution, and are thus fundamentally historical 
in nature.  
  The Industrial Revolution, in turn, can only be understood as the outcome of a 
historical process with multiple causes stretching well back into the medieval period, and 
in which international movements of commodities, warriors, microbes and technologies 
all played a leading role. Purely domestic accounts of the Rise of the West, emphasizing 
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they ignore the vast web of inter-relationships between Western Europe and the rest of 
the world that had been spun over the course of many centuries, and were crucially 
important for the breakthrough to modern economic growth. We are of course not the 
first to have argued this, but historians promoting such an international perspective have 
usually been Marxists, which we are not. Like most mainstream economists, we view 
inventiveness and incentives, rather than sheer accumulation, ‘primitive’ or otherwise, as 
being at the heart of growth, but this does not imply that European overseas expansion 
should be written off as irrelevant. Plunder may not have directly fuelled the Industrial 
Revolution, but mercantilism and imperialism were an important part of the global 
context within which it occurred, expanding markets and ensuring the supply of raw 
materials. Violence thus undoubtedly mattered, in shaping the environment within which 
the conventional economic forces of supply and demand operated. 
  In this manner, many of today’s key inter-regional tensions can be traced back to 
earlier interactions between the world’s main regions. In seeking to understand this 
history, economists need to think seriously about another subject they have too often 
neglected, namely geography. By ‘geography’, we do not mean the highly stylized 
models that pass for ‘economic geography’ today, in which ex ante indistinguishable 
regions symmetrically situated on a featureless plane, straight line, sphere or hexagon 
interact with each other and become different ex post, with small random events having 
impacts that are amplified and made permanent through the operation of increasing 
returns to scale. When we say geography, we mean geography: mountains, rivers and all. 
If Genghis Khan had been born in New Zealand, he would have left no traces on world 
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access to Southeast Asian spices, but never had the opportunities which geography 
afforded the rulers of Egypt. A European seeking direct access to India might well head 
westward and stumble across the Americas, but no Chinese sailor would have been 
foolish enough to seek an eastern passage to Arabia. Many possible outcomes in world 
history were ruled out ex ante, not just ex post. 
  The three great ‘world-historical’ events of the Second Millennium, in our 
account, are the ‘Black Death’ of the fourteenth century and the differing responses to it, 
the ‘discovery’ and incorporation of the New World into that of the Old at the turn of the 
sixteenth century, and the Industrial Revolution at the turn of the nineteenth. As we hope 
to demonstrate conclusively, no single region was solely responsible for any one of these 
three transformational episodes, let alone all three. The first resulted from the Pax 
Mongolica, established by the nomads of Central Asia but consolidated and actively 
participated in by all of the other six. Western Europeans were the first Eurasians to sail 
to the New World, but it was Africans, against their will, who produced the commodities 
that it exported to the Old. The Industrial Revolution occurred within Western Europe, 
and more specifically in Britain, but the essential raw material that its leading sector 
required was produced by Africans in the Americas, and the final products were sold in 
markets around the entire world. The world economy continues to evolve, with the lead 
of Western Europe and its various overseas offshoots clearly eroding, as East, South and 
Southeast Asia all expand much faster after previous centuries of relative stagnation. 
  Before asking the reader to plunge into a thousand years of history, it behooves us 
to provide a brief guide to the terrain that lies ahead. We begin in the first chapter with a 
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regions’ into which we divide the Eurasian landmass and the southern littoral of the 
Mediterranean at the beginning of the second millennium. These regions are Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, the Islamic World of the Middle East and North Africa, Central 
Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. Since all seven are defined not just by 
geography, but by culture and political history as well, we provide a brief account of 
what we consider to have been the defining characteristics of each. Thus we choose the 
division between western Roman Catholicism and eastern Orthodoxy to demarcate 
Western from Eastern Europe, rather than some geographical feature. The fall of 
Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks, in our scheme, transferred the remnants of the 
former Byzantine Empire to the Islamic World. In the case of Indonesia and the Malay 
world, however, we retain the geographic designation of these societies as Southeast 
Asian, along with their Buddhist neighbors, rather than shifting them into the Islamic 
World following their conversion to Islam, since we believe that they still had more in 
common with these neighbors than with Egyptians or Syrians. 
  The second chapter analyzes the trading and other relationships between these 
seven regions and an eighth, Sub-Saharan Africa, at the turn of the second millennium. 
The reader might be surprised to learn that the only region in sustained direct contact 
with all the others at this time was the Islamic World, then undergoing its Golden Age 
under the Abbasid, Fatimid and Umayyad Caliphates based in Baghdad, Cairo and 
Cordoba, while the one with the least contact with the others was Western Europe. The 
third chapter is a broad analytical survey of the evolution of the world economy from 
1000 to 1500. The key events on which we focus in this chapter are the forging of the 
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Mongol Empire, and stimulated long-distance trade from the Atlantic to the Sea of Japan; 
the devastating consequences of the Black Death, itself unleashed by the formation of 
what has been called a “microbian common market” as a result of the Mongol conquests; 
and the subsequent expansion of population, output and prices across the world, 
particularly in Western Europe and Southeast Asia.  
  This sets the stage for the launching of the Iberian voyages of discovery and their 
momentous consequences for the New World, Africa and Asia, dealt with in the fourth 
chapter, covering the period from about 1500 to 1650. A key economic consequence of 
Columbus that we will be exploring at length is the worldwide trade in silver that 
emerged during the sixteenth century. The fifth chapter focuses first on the long struggle 
for hegemony in the emerging world economy between the Dutch Republic, Great Britain 
and France during the Age of Mercantilism, and then on the hardly less momentous 
overland expansions, from opposite ends of Central Asia, of the Czarist empire of the 
Romanovs and the Chinese empire of the Manchu Qing Dynasty. One major theme of 
this chapter is the extent to which Asians were not just passive actors during this period, 
but adopted new military technologies, with similar political effects to those experienced 
in Europe; another is the mercantilist economic policies pursued by the leading states of 
the day.  
  The sixth chapter interrupts the historical narrative, to take a close look at the 
breakthrough to modern economic growth which occurred in northwestern Europe, and 
more particularly Great Britain, at the turn of the nineteenth century. The Industrial 
Revolution merits a separate chapter, since it is the fulcrum around which the rest of the 
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course of international trade, down to our own day; on the other, it was itself an outcome 
of the political and economic trends that preceded it. Thus we do not see the Industrial 
Revolution as springing up suddenly, like “Athena fully armed from the brow of Zeus,” 
purely as a result of the creative imaginations of a group of inventors in the north of 
England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As we hope to be able to 
convince the reader, we see it instead as the culmination of a long historical process 
involving the interaction of all the world’s regions through trade and the transfer of 
technology, as well as the use of armed force. This is not to deny the vital contribution of 
Great Britain, and more broadly Western Europe, but to provide a consistent and coherent 
explanation of why this event was so transformational in nature, rather than evanescent, 
as had been all the earlier “efflorescenses” (Goldstone 2002) in the history of the world 
economy that we describe. 
  On one level, the economic history of the past two centuries can as already noted 
be viewed as the working out of the consequences of the Industrial Revolution: a ‘Great 
Divergence’ in income levels between regions, as the new technologies diffused only 
gradually across the globe; a ‘Great Specialization’ between an industrial core and a 
primary-producing periphery; consequent pressures to protect agriculture in the core, and 
manufacturing in the periphery; and finally, a gradual unwinding of these trends as the 
Industrial Revolution spread to encompass an ever-increasing proportion of the globe. 
Indeed, we are still experiencing these entirely predictable consequences of events which 
took place in northern England two centuries ago. However, the evolution of these trends 
was not smooth, but was profoundly marked by the political consequences of three major 
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War I; and World War II. Warfare thus continued to exert a profound and long-lasting 
effect on the evolution of the international economy, and this is reflected in the structure 
of the book, with Chapters 7 through 9 each beginning with an account of the relevant 
conflict, and then proceeding to trace out its short and long run consequences. 
  Chapter 7 resumes our narrative, and focuses on the ‘long nineteenth century’ 
from 1815 to 1914. The era was marked politically by the Pax Britannica and European 
imperialism, and economically by the consequences of the new steam technology of the 
Industrial Revolution, embodied in the railroad and the steamship. It was early in this 
period that a new sort of globalization, manifested by a significant narrowing of 
intercontinental price gaps for bulk commodities between points of origin and 
destination, occurred pervasively around the world as a result of dramatic declines in 
transport costs. It is also the period when the ‘Great Specialization’ emerged, as a result 
of which the industrialized countries of Western Europe, eventually to be joined by the 
United States and Japan, exported manufactured goods to Asia, Africa, Australia and 
Latin America in exchange for primary foodstuffs and raw materials, with Europe also 
exporting capital to all these regions, and people to the Americas and Australia. The end 
of this period was marked by the beginnings of a ‘backlash’ against globalization, with 
the rising industrial powers of Germany and the United States, the food-importing 
countries of Continental Europe, the Latin American republics and the settler dominions 
of the British Empire all raising tariffs; while the New World starting displaying a 
reluctance to remain open to mass immigration. This first ‘Golden Age of Globalization’ 
was of course brought to a tragic and abrupt end by the outbreak of the First World War. 
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politically and economically by the aftermath of this catastrophe. While the 1920s saw an 
attempt to reconstruct the pre-war international economy, which enjoyed only partial 
success, the 1930s were marked by the devastating consequences of the Great 
Depression, and the resulting retreat from globalization. The Second World War and its 
aftermath are the subject of Chapter 9, the key political events being the establishment of 
the Pax Americana and the associated framework of multilateral international institutions 
set up under its aegis; the political transformations wrought first by the spread of 
Communism and then by its collapse; and the sweeping decolonization of areas in the 
Third World that had become imperial possessions of the European powers. We stress 
that the combined effect of these trends was to further disintegrate the world economy, 
with OECD liberalization constituting a regional exception to this general rule, until 
some time in the 1970s or 1980s. It was only then that Latin America, Asia and Africa, 
where the bulk of humanity reside, started to open up to trade and investment with the 
rest of the world. Economically, the late twentieth century was to a large extent 
dominated by the attempt of newly independent countries to industrialize through policies 
of ‘import substitution’. However, the period also saw the unprecedented expansion of 
world output and trade as a result of trade liberalization and growth in the industrial 
countries, and technological diffusion to ‘newly industrializing countries’. This 
eventually led to the rapid growth of manufactured exports from these countries, 
particularly China and India, and to the beginnings of a narrowing of the huge per capita 
income gaps that have separated these once prosperous regions from Western Europe 
since the Industrial Revolution, and probably even before. The tenth and final chapter 
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we believe may still be relevant at the start of the twenty first century. 
  The reader will have noticed that our successive eras in the evolution of the world 
economy, and not just those covered by Chapters 7 through 9, have been demarcated 
mostly by the outbreaks of major wars or imperial expansions. Each era can be seen as 
one in which trade is conducted within a geopolitical framework established by the 
previous major war or conflict, that is in turn altered by the outbreak of the next war, 
setting the stage for the next trade epoch and so on. It is natural to suspect that the 
accumulating economic and geopolitical tensions unleashed in the course of each period 
of peace, prosperity and trade culminate in successive rounds of conflict, so that wars, 
rather than being exogenous shocks to the world system, have been inherent in its very 
nature as it has evolved over the past millennium. For the most part this process will, we 
hope, become clear from our narrative, although we confess that the First World War still 
appears as somewhat of a diabolus ex machina in our account. There is of course no 
shortage of authorities who have argued that the way in which the late nineteenth century 
world economy operated helps explain the eruption of World War I, but the causes of this 
disaster remain controversial. “Had we but world enough, and time”, we might have done 
better, but there are only so many cans of worms that one can open in the course of 
writing a book, and this is one can that we have decided to leave closed. 
   Economics is often accused of being an imperialistic discipline, and plunder was 
an essential feature of many of the empires that we will be considering below. We have 
enthusiastically followed the example of the conquistadores in this respect, 
unscrupulously plundering the knowledge that has been laboriously produced by 
  14generations of historians and economists before us. Unlike the conquistadores, however, 
we have done so in the hopes of being civilized by the natives, rather than the reverse. 
There is a lot in this book, therefore, that will be entirely unremarkable to any moderately 
well trained historian, but which we hope will be of interest in its present form not just to 
economists, economic historians, political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists, but 
to the broad community of all those with a serious interest in globalization, and who like 
us want to better understand the origins of the international economy of the early twenty 
first century. If the way that we approach the evidence as economists adds some value to 
historical debates, then so much the better.  
  Though our discipline strictly informs and shapes our argument at every point, we 
have not felt it necessary to burden our text with sustained stretches of formal 
mathematical or quantitative analysis, though we frequently refer the reader to works, 
including some of our own, that use such methods to reach and sustain conclusions of 
interest to the general reader. Both of us can truthfully say that we know vastly more 
about the historical evolution of the world economy after writing this book than we did 
when we began, despite having devoted much of our previous professional lives to the 
study of it. We hope that we can pass on to the reader at least some of the excitement and 
understanding that this perhaps all too ambitious project has given us. 
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